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Distracted from Distraction by
Distraction: Reimagining Estate Tax
Reform
Edward J. McCaffery*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. DECADES OF DISTRACTION
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE ESTATE TAX AND DYNASTIC
WEALTH
IV. THE GORILLA IN THE ROOM
V. CONCLUSIONS, ADVICE, AND THE CURIOUS CASE FOR HOPE
I. INTRODUCTION
The title of this symposium is Tax Advice for the Second Obama
Administration. I find myself on a panel, one of four for the day, discussing

* Robert C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law and Professor of Law, Economics, and Political
Science, University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and Visiting Professor of Law and
Economics, California Institute of Technology. I thank Stephan Airapetian and June Yang for
excellent research assistance. The title of this Article alludes to a line from T.S. Eliot’s Burnt
Norton, the first poem in Four Quartets, which reads, in relevant part:
Cleansing affection from the temporal.
Neither plenitude nor vacancy. Only a flicker
Over the strained time-ridden faces
Distracted from distraction by distraction
Filled with fancies and empty of meaning
Tumid apathy with no concentration
Men and bits of paper, whirled by the cold wind . . . .
T.S. ELIOT, BURNT NORTON pt. III, in FOUR QUARTETS.
This article incorporates extracts from pp. 12–13 & 15 of EDWARD MCCAFFREY, OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: INCOME TAX LAW (2012). Copyright © 2012 Oxford University
Press. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. This article also includes portions
derived from Edward J. McCaffery, A Progressive’s Silver Lining Playbook: Repeal Stepped-Up
Basis, TAX NOTES, February 25, 2013, at 969, 972. Printed with the permission of Tax Analysts.
This article was first presented at the Pepperdine Law Review’s Tax Advice for the Second Obama
Administration symposium, held at Pepperdine University School of Law on January 18, 2013, and
co-sponsored by Tax Analysts. I thank the many conference participants, especially Joe Thorndike
for his detailed commentary.
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estate and gift taxation. My short, simple advice to the Administration on
the specific point of the gift and estate tax is to, as they say in certain parts
of the country, “fuggedaboutit!”
The gift and estate tax has long since ceased to be a major part of any
compelling policy objective—such as, to name four, raising revenue,
instilling progressivity into the tax system, “backing up” the income tax, or
breaking up large concentrations of wealth.1 Two decades of reform and
repeal efforts have produced scores of votes, boatloads of campaign
contributions and lobbying expenditures, and a tax more porous and limited
than ever.2 Left on life support by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
20123 (ATRA 2012)—the fiscal cliff “fix” bill from January 1, 2013—the
so-called death tax will now affect far fewer than 1% of decedents each
year.4 What is more, the continuing structure of the law, with its now
“permanently” unified exemption of $5 million, indexed off a 2011 baseline,
for gift, estate, and generation-skipping taxes, actually provides a perfectly
handy roadmap for the creation and perpetuation of dynastic wealth—
exactly the opposite effect of the best intentions behind the tax.5
It is time to give up on the idea that we will ever see a meaningful
tightening of the gift, estate, and generation-skipping taxes, or their outright
repeal.6 It is time to stop being distracted by the gift and estate tax—or what
is left of it—and move on to address more seriously the concerns behind the
tax in the first place.7 The gift and estate tax is now largely irrelevant, but its
animating principles—the desires to raise revenue, insert more progression
into the tax system, and back up the income tax system—are not irrelevant.
Indeed, they are more pressing than ever.
The first section of this Article canvasses the recent legislative history of
the estate tax, with a particular emphasis on the Taxpayer Relief,

1. Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283,
289–90 (1994).
2. See generally Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The
New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006).
3. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (codified as
amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.A. (West 2013)).
4. Paul Sullivan, The End of a Decade of Uncertainty over Gift and Estate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2013, at B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/your-money/fiscal-deal-endsdecade-of-uncertainty-over-gift-and-estate-taxes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
5. See id.
6. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform¸ 65 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 21, 21 (Aug. 14, 2012), .http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/
articles/65-SLRO-21.pdf (“Congress has shown an appetite for keeping the issue of estate tax repeal
alive through a never-ending series of brinksmanship votes; it never does anything fundamental or,
for that matter, principled, but rakes in cash year in and year out for just considering the matter.”).
7. Id. (discussing the underlying idea that Congress perpetuates the issue of estate tax repeal for
the benefit of its individual members).
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Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 20108
(TRA 2010) and ATRA 2012. The second section explains in greater detail
why the gift and estate tax, especially as now constituted, cannot serve any
of its compelling justifications in general, and takes a closer look at the
phenomenon of “dynasty” or “perpetual” trusts in particular.9 The third
section turns toward the 800 pound gorilla in the room—unrealized
appreciation.10 Untaxed capital wealth is the key to engaging in high levels
of consumption, not savings, completely tax-free, under what I have dubbed
“Tax Planning 101,” or the simple advice to buy, borrow, and die.11 The
fourth and final section contains my advice, and reasons for hope, by
completing the circle. Without a meaningful estate tax, the principal
justification for the stepped-up basis on death rule—one of the central pillars
of Tax Planning 101—disappears, and the case for moving to a carryover
basis or a realization-on-death regime strengthens.12 In sum, with the
distraction of gift and estate tax reform or repeal on hold for the indefinite
future, perhaps we can turn to potentially effective means to generate more
progressivity and less concentration in wealth holdings in America,
including abandoning the long-time statutory rule of a “stepped-up” basis for
assets acquired from a decedent.13
II. DECADES OF DISTRACTION
The story of estate tax reform as it has led to the status quo can begin in
many different places, but let us choose the time when the well-named Death
Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 8, was introduced by Representative Christopher
Cox (R-Ca).14 Over the next six years there were several votes, culminating
in Bill Clinton’s veto of a bill to kill the death tax that had passed both the
House and Senate with significant Democratic support.15 Then came George
W. Bush, a Republican House and Senate, and near-certain repeal.16 Only
we got the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
8. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2006).
14. See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1201–03; see also Death Tax Elimination Act of
2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 101.
15. See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1203.
16. Id. at 1207.
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(EGTRRA) instead.17 This Act gradually weakened the gift and estate tax,
raising its exemption levels and lowering its rates, until 2009, when the
exemption was set to be $3.5 million and the rate 45%.18
The only technical statutory matters that really affect this Article’s
analysis are the tax’s rate and its exemption levels—and whether or not
these exemption levels apply to lifetime gifts as well as to death-bed
transfers. The exemption levels noted are per individual donor or transferor;
married couples, with proper planning, can double them.19 Virtually all of
the discussions and negotiations in and around ATRA 2012 were about
exemption levels (specifically, $3.5 versus $5 million, with $5 million
prevailing) and rates (specifically 35% or 45%, with 40% being the
compromised answer).20 This Article introduces the relevance of the
difference between a “carryover” basis, as exists for gifts21—meaning that
the donee takes the donor’s basis, and hence any built-in gain is preserved—
versus a “stepped-up” basis, as we have for assets passing from a decedent22
—meaning that the donee or transferee’s basis is the asset’s fair market
value, such that all built-in gain has disappeared for tax purposes. This issue
was not on any table inside the Beltway as the nation careened towards its
self-created fiscal cliff.23
In 2010 there was to be no estate tax at all under EGTRRA—an infinite
exemption, as it were—at the “cost” of a carryover basis rather than the
traditional stepped-up one.24 EGTRRA was then set to expire after 2010,
bringing (in 2011) a return to a $1 million exemption and a 55% rate for gift
and estate taxes.25 There were many votes during the first decade of this
century, but none stuck.26 As EGTRRA played itself out, the law seemed
headed to a place considered unimaginable to many: a year without an estate
tax at all. Surely, something would have to happen to prevent that extreme
result from obtaining.
Only it did not. The Year 2009 saw no end-of-the-year patch or fix to
17. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38 (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C., including the I.R.C.); see
McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1208.
18. McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1208.
19. See infra Figs. 1 & 2; see also McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1180–81.
20. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (codified
as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.A. (West 2013)).
21. See I.R.C. § 1015 (2006).
22. See I.R.C. § 1014. (2006).
23. See Ashlea Ebeling, Buffett, Carter, Gates Sr. and Friends Call For Estate Tax with 45%
Teaser Rate amid Fiscal Cliff Negotiations, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:58 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2012/12/11/buffet-carter-gates-sr-and-friends-call-forestate-tax-with-45-teaser-rate-amid-fiscal-cliff-negotiations/.
24. See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1212.
25. Id. at 1208–09, 1209 n.166.
26. Id. at 1209–1210.
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the situation that EGTRRA created.27 What follows is a point that some
observers of Congress and the estate tax saga fail to understand. Many
interested persons concluded that a divided and highly partisan Congress
simply never acts, such that, now, in 2013, we would be seeing a return to
the pre-EGTRRA levels of a $1 million exemption and a 55% rate—the
inertial default.28 For such observers, what happened at the end of 2009—
that is, nothing—became the decisive proof of the pudding. But looking at
things over a slightly wider lens of time, we see a different pattern.
Congress does not act when tax decreases result from inaction—hence, the
inaction in 2009 and at the beginning of 2010. Congress does act when tax
increases would result from inaction—hence, the congressional action at the
end of 2010 (to create and extend the $5 million exemption and 35% rate29
(TRA 2010)), 2011 (to renew the “payroll tax holiday”30), and 2012 (ATRA
2012).
The particular bill from 2010 bears closer analysis. For one thing, TRA
2010 retroactively gave estates for decedents who died in 2010, like George
Steinbrenner, a choice: accept the no estate tax/carryover basis regime
provided for by EGTRRA, or instead choose a $5 million exemption,
“portable” between spouses, and a 35% rate, with stepped-up basis.31 The
very fact that this was a choice—not to mention that most families chose the
latter, nominally taxable, option—shows how deep the concerns over stepup basis run. I address those concerns below.
TRA 2010 did one more thing: it “reunified” the gift, estate, and
generation-skipping exemption levels, which had been torn asunder by
EGTRRA. Prior to EGTRRA, and for some time, the exemption level was
the same for inter vivos transfers under the gift tax and death-time transfers
under the estate tax, as well as for generation-skipping taxes once those

27. See id. at 1220 (“EGTRRA left the law with that high exemption level/high marginal rate
structure until 2010, when the tax is altogether repealed, only to be brought back, high marginal tax
rates and all, in 2011.”).
28. See id.
29. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified .in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
30. Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, 125 Stat. 1280
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
31. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296; see also Scott E. Vincent, Overview of 2010 Tax Relief Act, 67
J. MO. B. 56, 59 (2011) (“After a one-year hiatus, the 2010 Act reinstates the estate tax for 2011 and
2012, with a top rate of 35 percent. The exemption amount will be $5 million per individual in 2011
and will be indexed to inflation in following years. Estates of people who died in 2010 can choose
to follow either 2010’s or 2011’s rules.”).
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came into play in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.32 EGTRRA, however, kept
the gift tax exemption level at $1 million, including in its no-estate-tax year,
2010. What this meant, in practice, was that one had to die to take
advantage of the higher exemption levels. It also kept alive a meaningful
political threat that the estate tax could one day come back in fuller force,
since the living could not use large exemption levels to whittle down their
ultimate estates.
Now is as good a place as any to make the general point that exemption
levels under the gift and estate tax do not come down. They have not since
1935, when the exemption for both went from $50,000 to $40,000.33 Setting
that one year aside, we could say exemption levels never come down. If we
ignore the “infinity” of 2010, and count it instead as a $5 million exemption,
there has been a steady increase. Figure 1 shows the history of the
exemption level under the estate tax, in nominal dollars.

Figure 1: Estate Tax Exemption, 1916-2013



TRA 2010 changed the pattern established under EGTRRA. It very
importantly—and rather quietly—reunified the three transfer taxes, making
their exemption levels $5 million each, indexed for inflation off a 2011
32. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); see Jeffrey Rohaly,
Wealth Transfer Taxes: How Do the Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes Work?,
TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/estate/what-is.cfm
(last updated June 13, 2011). See generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY,
SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH (1987).
33. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., DAVID JOULFAIAN, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX:
DESCRIPTION, PROFILE OF TAXPAYERS, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, I.R.S. OTA Paper 80 (Dec.
1998), available at http://ipv6.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/o
ta80.pdf.
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baseline (thus the exemptions rose to $5,120,000 in 2012).34 In other words,
while TRA 2010 technically continued the estate tax exemption of 2010 for
another two years, with indexing, it increased more than five-fold the gift
and generation-skipping exemptions.35 Figure 2 shows the gift and estate tax
exemption levels since 1976. Note the gap between the two, evident since
2006, and closed—at the estate tax’s higher level—in 2011.

Figure 2: Gift and estate tax exemptions 1976-present
This was a very big deal, and suggests that another major lobbying force
had entered the room: the dynasty trust crowd. “Dynasty” or “perpetual
trusts” are one of the great unintended consequences of all time in tax law,
which is saying quite a bit.36 They sprung into life after the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 finally shut down a “loophole” in the transfer tax system.37 The topic
bears some further explanation.
Normally, gift and estate taxes apply to beneficent transfers. These go
from parent, Generation 1, to child, Generation 2.38 At some point
thereafter, Generation 2 faces its estate planning issues, and passes some
wealth along to Generation 3, and so on. The gift and estate tax stands ready
at each transfer to come down on large transmissions.39 But truly wealthy

34. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified .in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
35. See id.
36. Edward J. McCaffery, Through the Looking Glass: The Politics of Estate Tax Reform, 35
AM. COLLEGE TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 121, 124 (2009).
37. Id. at 124; see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
38. See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 315 (discussing the “complex generationskipping tax” and the push toward early gifts).
39. See id.
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families can afford to “skip” generations. Thus grandparents, in Generation
1, can pass wealth onto grandchildren, in Generation 3, “skipping” the need
to pay taxes at Generation 2. Estate planners, being a clever breed, devised
ways to make these transfers in trust, with Generation 2 having limited but
significant access—the family can have their cake and eat it too.40 The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 added a “generation-skipping tax” to stop this perceived
abuse, such that transfers from Generation 1 to Generation 3 or beyond
would bear a double transfer tax.41
Only there was an exemption level for generation-skipping taxes too—
initially set at $1 million per transferor.42 And this exemption provided a
roadmap: a couple would place $2 million or more (with “fractional share
discounts” and other valuation techniques to be discussed below) into a
generation-skipping tax-exempt trust and never pay transfer tax.43 The next
question for many wealthy families and their advisors was: how long could
such trusts last? The initial answer was for as long as the Rule Against
Perpetuities allows.44 But this answer was considered unsatisfactory for the
enlightened, and so the next step was to eliminate the Rule Against
Perpetuities in many jurisdictions, provided that the assets be placed in trust;
that the trustee have the power to dispose of particular assets—and usually,
that the trustee be local.45 Because individuals can choose any state law to
govern their private contracts or trusts, wealthy individuals in New York,
California, Illinois, and the like were soon flocking to dynasty or perpetual
trusts in faraway places such as Delaware, Alaska, and South Dakota.46 By
2003, one study suggested that there were $100 billion in dynasty trusts,
mainly in South Dakota.47 Today, South Dakota (with a large Citibank

40. See Joseph P. Toce, Jr. & Joseph R. Kluemper, Estate Planning for Expatriates Under
Chapter 15, 40 EST. PLANNING J. 3, 9 (2013).
41. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
501, 507–08 (2006) (“Since 1986, a host of states have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities as
applied to interests in trust. The driving force for this abrupt turn-about was not a careful
consideration of the ancient policy against perpetuities, but rather a 1986 reform to the federal tax
code. . . . In a state that has abolished the Rule, successive generations can benefit from the trust
fund, free from federal wealth transfer taxation, forever.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
45. See id.
46. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1035, 1055 n.108 (2000) (“Although focus here is on asset protection trusts, a number of states
have also begnn [sic] to compete for trust business by abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities,
thereby making it possible for a settlor to create a “dynasty” or “perpetual” trust that avoids estate
taxation, as well as permitting a settlor to retain greater “dead hand” control of property. Idaho and
Wisconsin, for example, have long disregarded the Rule Against Perpetuities. The South Dakota
legislature has taken the same path.” (internal citation omitted)).
47. Sitkoff, supra note 44, at 501 (“In a recent empirical study, Max Schanzenbach and I found
that, through 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust assets have poured into the abolishing states.”
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presence) is the state with the highest banking deposits—$2.5 trillion as of
June 2012.48 Not coincidentally, Senator Tim Johnson, a Democrat from
South Dakota, is chairman of the Senate Banking Committee.49
Dynasty trusts and the financiers who run them—as well as insurance
companies, who often sell “second-to-die” life insurance policies on wealthy
married couples as the highly income-tax-favored asset to be held in dynasty
trusts—were huge winners from TRA 2010.50 Instead of being able to put
down $2 million for a dynasty trust or insurance policy, it appeared—
perhaps for two years only!—that the same couple could now lay down $10
million.51 Anecdotal evidence shared with this author suggests that, for
major banks and trust companies, the number of dynasty trusts created in
2012 more than quadrupled.
In any event, all that had come before set the stage for the “fiscal cliff”
slated for January 1, 2013, when EGTRAA (which had been extended by
TRA 2010 for two years) and other tax provisions were set to expire.52
Insofar as the estate tax was concerned, the law as written meant a return to
the $1 million exemption and 55% rate of pre-EGTRRA times.53 Some
practitioners, aided by the media, stirred up fears that this would indeed
happen, leading to aggressive planning under the large gift tax exemption in
place for 2012.54 This was precisely the situation that could not obtain under

(footnote omitted)).
48. Jodi Schwan, State Ranks No. 1 in Bank Assets, SIOUX FALLS BUS. J. (June 19, 2012, 9:41
AM), http://siouxfallsbusinessjournal.argusleader.com/article/20120620/BJNEWS02/306200033/Sta
te-ranks-No-1-bank-assets.
49. Committee Information, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URB. AFF.,
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=CommitteeInformation.Home
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2013).
50. See McCaffery, Dirty Little Secret, supra note 6, at 26.
51. Id. at 24–25; see also Mary D. Cascino, Dynasty Trusts for Everyone, 100 ILL. B.J. 440,
440–41 (2012).
52. Bob Seaberg, Gift and Estate Taxes in 2012: The “Clock” is Ticking, MORGAN STANLEY
(Oct. 2012), http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=bob%20seaberg%2C%20gift%20and%20est
ate%20taxes%20in%202012%3A%20the%20%E2%80%9Cclock%E2%80%9D%20is%20ticking&
source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Finstitutionalconsulting.citi.c
om%2Fpublic%2Fprojectfiles%2Fe4e98a48-a7d5-4749-86f2-95cc7ac91908.pdf&ei=R3tUUcyTLKr
KiAL31ICgAw&usg=AFQjCNHChASFQOADjzU7O-db_L8UifqpUQ&bvm=bv.44442042,d.cGE;
see also Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified .in scattered sections of the I.R.C. (2006)).
53. See McCaffery, Dirty Little Secret, supra note 6, at 26. Compare Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), with Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of
U.S.C., including the I.R.C.). Paul Bonner, A Sea Change for Gift and Estate Planning, J. ACCT.
(July 2011), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2011/Jul/20114035.htm.
54. Id.; Seaberg, supra note 52.
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the initial ten EGTRRA years, because the gift tax exemption had stayed
frozen at $1 million.55
But, in point of fact, a full return to Year 2000 levels never seemed to be
in the cards. President Obama, as he had in his 2008 platform, consistently
staked out a position at a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% rate—the 2009
status quo.56 In December 2012, Obama reiterated his stance, and
commentators “scored” the proposal as raising $119 billion over ten years,
from the 2012 baseline.57 Seemingly within minutes of the president’s
announcement, however, Senator Max Baucus, the Democratic chair of the
Senate Finance Committee, came out in dissent, supporting a perpetuation of
the status quo—a $5 million exemption, indexed off 2011, and a 35% rate.58
And it appears that is what would have happened, with a late leak suggesting
that there was a deal brokered by Vice President Biden and Senator Mitch
McConnell (R-Ky) at a $5 million exemption and 35% rate.59 The same
purported deal featured a return to the top pre-EGTRRA marginal income
tax rate of 39.6% for individuals earning more than $400,000 and married
couples earning more than $450,000.60 At this point, Senator Tom Harkin
(D-Ia), objecting from the left, took to the floor of the Senate and stated that
the purported deal was too much of a giveaway to the rich, with its $400,000
and $450,000 floor on tax rate increases for singles and married couples, and
its $5 million, 35% rate on estates.61 More specifically, Senator Harkin said
he could accept one, but not both, of these levels.62 The next the public
heard, the deal was struck, with the Senate overwhelmingly approving
ATRA 2012 with a triple-transfer tax exemption of $5 million and a rate of
40% and the income tax rate levels as leaked.63 Senator Harkin was among
the eight Senators voting “no.”64 “Moderate Democrats from farm states”

55.
56.

See Seaberg, supra note 52.
Kim Dixon, Obama Estate Tax Push Undercut by Discord Among Democrats, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 30, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/30/obama-estatetax_n_2216992.html.
57. Richard Rubin, Buffett Joins Soros in Effort to Raise Taxes on Estates, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
11, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-11/buffett-joins-soros-in-effort-toraise-taxes-on-estates.html.
58. Robert Frank, Next Battle on the “Cliff’s” Edge: Estate Taxes, CNBC (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:23
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100296248/Next_Battle_on_the_039Cliff039s039_Edge_Estate_Taxes.
59. Ramsey Cox & Alexander Bolton, Dem Sen. Harkin Criticizes Possible Tax Compromise in
“Fiscal Cliff” Talks, THE HILL (Dec. 31, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://thehill.com/video/senate/274975harkin-this-is-one-democrat-who-doesnt-agree-with-tax-cuts-for-the-wealthy.
60. Id.
61. See Cox & Bolton, supra note 59.
62. Id.
63. Chris Frates, McConnell: Tax Deal Struck with Biden, NAT’L J. (Dec. 31, 2012, 3:27 PM),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/mcconnell-tax-deal-struck-with-biden-20121231.
64. Cox & Bolton, supra note 59; John Nichols, Why Tom Harkin and a Handful of Other
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were credited in the press with insisting that the exemption levels remain
unified and indexed for inflation—with South Dakota and Montana possibly
counting as “farm states.”65
At the end of the day, the raise in the gift and estate tax rate to 40% was
“scored” as a tax increase of $19 billion over ten years, which is a little hard
to believe, given that the Tax Policy Center has estimated that the entire
estate tax would bring in $10.6 billion in 2011, with essentially the same law
in place as in 2013, with the exception of the 40% rate.66 As time goes by,
the very large gift and generation-skipping exemptions left in place by
ATRA 2012 have the capacity to greatly shrink the estate tax’s base. In the
meantime, to put the $19 billion over ten years from the slight rate increase
in perspective, the expiration of the 2% payroll tax holiday is said to bring in
$100 billion—a year.67
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE ESTATE TAX AND DYNASTIC
WEALTH
It is hard to overstate the extent to which the generous exemption levels
and other rules and practicalities of the estate tax have led to its practical
evisceration. It was in 1979, after all, that George Cooper published his
classic study of the wealth transfer tax system, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance.68 Cooper based his
book on studies and interviews mainly performed before the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 took effect, when the exemption level was $60,000 and the
highest rate 70%.69 As I have written elsewhere, Cooper’s main point—
namely, that those wealthy families, like the DuPonts, who happened to be
so motivated could largely avoid the estate tax altogether—has remained
Progressives Opposed the Deal, THE NATION (Jan. 2, 2013, 2:04 AM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/171960/why-tom-harkin-and-handful-other-progressives-opposeddeal.
65. See Dixon, supra note 56.
66. Dean Zerbe, Fiscal Cliff Tax Deal: What Does It Mean for Small Business?, FORBES (Jan. 1,
2013, 11:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deanzerbe/2013/01/01/fiscal-cliff-tax-deal-whatdoes-it-mean-for-small-business/; Baseline Estate Tax Returns; Current Law and Multiple Reform
Proposals, 2011–2021, TAX POL’Y CENTER (June, 2, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
numbers/displayatab.cfm?Docid=3037&DocTypeID=7.
67. Richard Rubin et al., Bipartisan House Backs Tax Deal Vote as Next Fight Looms,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-02/bipartisanhouse-backs-tax-deal-vote-as-next-fight-looms.html.
68. GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX? NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED ESTATE
TAX AVOIDANCE (1979).
69. Cf. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
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true.70 My own analysis on that point was published in 2000, before the
higher exemption levels and lower rates of EGTRRA had come into place.71
Today, estate planning practitioners use vehicles and techniques such as
grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs), family limited partnerships (FLPs),
fractional share discounts, insurance and charitable trusts, and more to plan
around the tax.72 A particularly attractive device of late, using the current
high gift tax exemption levels combined with historically low interest rates
on intra-family transactions—the “applicable federal rate” (AFR) that
families can use for non-gift loans among themselves has, for some time,
been around 1% for loans up to nine years in duration, and has dropped as
low as 0.22% for loans up to three years—has been what is called a sale to
an “intentionally defective grantor trust” (IDGT).73 Mitt Romney rather
famously used this device and, even as he sits on a personal fortune
estimated by Forbes to be $250 million, his five children have trusts with an
aggregate value of $100 million, all presumably put in place with little or no
transfer taxes having been paid.74 The technique bears explaining, if only for
illustrative purposes.
An individual, as the grantor, sets up a trust for his children that is
irrevocable for gift tax purposes but is essentially ignored for income tax
ones because of a deliberate “defect” in the trust’s terms, generally involving
the retention of some power or control.75 Just as with the dynasty trusts
discussed above, the “intentionally defective trust” strategy is a story of
unintended consequences.76 In the 1970s, with high and highly variable
income tax rates, “income shifting” within the family became an attractive
game.77 It was better for Junior, in his low bracket, to be responsible for
income tax, rather than the Seniors, in their high one. This gave an incentive
for Seniors to give wealth to their children and have the children pay tax on
its yield.78 The rub was that many parents, perhaps having read King Lear,79

70. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? Revisited, 93 NAT’L TAX ASS’N
PROC. 268 (2001).
71. Id.
72. See generally Richard M. Goldstein & Derek P. Richman, Estate Planning in a Low Interest
Rate Environment, 7 J. RETIREMENT PLAN. 21 (2004).
73. See generally Stephen R. Akers et al., Creating Intentional Grantor Trusts, 44 REAL PROP.
TR. & EST. L.J. 207 (2009).
74. Jesse Drucker, Romney “I Dig It” Trust Gives Heirs Triple Benefit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27,
2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-27/romney-i-dig-it-trust-gives-heirstriple-benefit.html.
75. See Akers et al., supra note 73, at 211.
76. See id. at 220–22 (noting such consequences).
77. Id. at 224.
78. Drucker, supra note 74.
79. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1:
(Since now we will divest us both of rule,
Interest of territory, cares of state),
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were fearful of what might happen if they simply gave their kids the keys to
the kingdom.80 Such parents would set up trusts for their minor children,
having the trust pay the income to the kids—whose guardian, that is the
parents, would then collect the income and use it for the kids’ needs, like
medical and educational expenses, which the parents would have paid
anyway.81 To avoid the King Lear problem, the grantor would provide that
the trust would terminate, and come back to him after, say, eighteen years.82
The IRS did not like the tax reduction that resulted from this particular
game, so they enacted rules that shut the technique down.83 For income tax
purposes, such trusts would continue to be the responsibility of the grantor,
or parent, in his high tax bracket.84 Such trusts were deemed “defective.”85
But, for gift tax purposes, the trust was deemed to be a completed gift.86
These rules meant a double whammy for the client of the 1970s—he would
be denied his income tax shift and get hit with a gift tax to boot.87
Alas, the punishment has turned into a blessing for taxpayers. Clients
now “intentionally” create such defective trusts.88 They then transfer some
cash into them.89 Then they use the cash as a 10% down-payment on a sale
of some valuable family asset. The remaining 90% balance is paid with a
note, at the low AFR. Because the trust is ignored for income tax
purposes—it is defective, after all—there is no gain recognized on the sale.
The grantor continues to pay income tax on the gains of the trust, which is a
further gift-tax free benefit to the next generation or generations.

Which of you shall we say doth love us most,
That we our largest bounty may extend . . . .
Spoiler alert: Lear’s plan to divide up his empire while he was alive and give it to his children inter
vivos ended badly.
80. G. Warren Whitaker, Classic Issues in Family Succession Planning, 17 PROB. & PROP.,
Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 32, 33–34 (2003).
81. Drucker, supra note 74.
82. Drucker, supra note 74; see also Whitaker, supra note 80.
83. See Akers et al., supra note 73, at 277 n.367.
84. See generally Akers et al., supra note 73. Cf. Drucker, supra note 74 (discussing the trusts
of Mitt Romney’s children).
85. See Akers et al., supra note 73, at 211.
86. See Akers et al., supra note 73, at 221 n.69 (explaining the nature of a “complete gift”).
87. See id. at 218.
88. See John P. Dedon & Daniel E. Ingersoll, Traps and Concerns in Using Intentionally
Defective Grantor Trusts, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Aug. 2012, at 71–77, available at
http://dedononestateplanning.typepad.com/files/practical-tax-strategies-aug-2012-article-3.pdf. See
generally Daniel L. Ricks, Article, I Dig It, but Congress Shouldn’t Let Me: Closing the IDGT
Loophole, 36 AM. COLLEGE TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 641 (2010).
89. See Dedon & Ingersoll, supra note 88, at 73 for material supporting the assertions made in
the following sentences. See generally Ricks, supra note 88.
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Now let us add some numbers, using the gift tax exemption levels from
2011–2012, continued into perpetuity it would seem by ATRA 2012. A
husband and wife transfer $10 million into an IDGT for their children. The
IDGT then buys an asset from the parents using the $10 million cash, down,
and a note for $90 million, interest only for nine years, at an interest rate
under 1%. Now the IDGT holds an asset or business valued at $100 million,
and must make interest payments—income tax-free, by the way—of under
$1 million a year.90 And in fact the asset or business is almost certainly
worth more than $100 million, because the taxpayer-client controls the
valuation in the first instance, and well-tested methods such as “fractional
share discounts” routinely reduce the value of assets for gift and estate tax
purposes.91 Martin Sullivan has estimated that one-half to two-thirds of all
value for taxable estates escapes the base because of these strategies alone.92
Imagine then that the IDGT in reality holds an asset worth $200 million,
valued at $100 million for transfer tax purposes. If that asset grows at a rate
of 5% a year, the IDGT is growing by a net $9 million—$10 million
appreciation minus $1 million interest—all income-tax free to the IDGT.
After ten years, the IDGT has grown by nearly $90 million, to a real value of
$290 million. It pays off the $90 million note, and the children now have a
trust, transfer-tax free, with a value of $200 million.
Such results—and more—can be achieved with a $10 million
exemption. Moreover, the generation-skipping tax exemption can and is
routinely applied to IDGTs,93 and the $10 million “seed” money can easily
purchase a single-premium, second-to-die life insurance policy, leaving the
income tax-free investing to others and lying in wait until a South Dakota
dynasty trust holding $100 million or so in cash comes into full bloom.
Estate planning blew up in 2012.94 Clients, motivated by the carrot of a
$5.12 million per donor gift tax exemption, and the stick of the return of a $1
million exemption and 55% rate, rushed to make non-taxable gifts by yearend.95 A big winner, as intimated above, were dynasty trusts.96
Let us return to the four possible goals for estate taxation noted above:
raising revenue, instilling progressivity into the tax system, “backing up” the

90. Cf. Dedon & Ingersoll, supra note 88, at 73 (providing a comparable example).
91. See McCaffery, Looking Glass, supra note 36, at 124.
92. See generally Martin Sullivan, For Richest Americans, Two-Thirds of Wealth Escapes Estate
Tax, 87 TAX NOTES 328 (2000).
93. See Dedon & Ingersoll, supra note 88, at 72–73.
94. Paul Sullivan, To Give or Not to Give, Up to $5.12 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, at
B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/your-money/to-give-or-not-to-give-up-to-512-million.html?pagewanted=all.
95. Id.
96. See id.
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income tax, and breaking up large concentrations of wealth.97 The estate tax,
such as it now stands, post ATRA 2012, would seem to be zero for four on
these policy objectives.
It never has, and certainly will not now, raise much revenue.98 The Tax
Policy Center has estimated that the 2011 estate tax—for which the current
law exemption of $5 million was in place, and the rate was 35%—resulted in
fewer than 3500 taxable estate tax returns and less than $11 billion in
revenue.99 This is less than 1% of the annual deficit, and a rather trivial
collection effort in gross. Recall that allowing the payroll tax rate to go up
by 2% in absolute terms, applying to earned income (wages) for individuals
up to around $110,000, is estimated to bring in an additional $100 billion per
year of revenue.100 And the case that the estate tax loses revenue, on
balance, is more compelling than ever, given the significant income tax
savings from various insurance and charitable trusts—not to mention the
losses from the stepped-up basis for assets-acquired-on-death rule, to which
I shall return, and which can plausibly be thought of as part of the broader
transfer tax regime.
Nor is there all that much “progressivity” being served by the relics of
the death tax regime. The estate tax will now apply to something like 0.3%
of decedents each year.101 These are wealthy people to be sure, some of
whom simply did not care to plan around the tax, or who were surprised by
an early death. For many who do pay the tax, however, the true effective
rate will be one-half or less of the stated rate of 40%, which is historically
low.102 And it bears noting that an effective rate of 20% is less than the
capital gains rate of 23.8%—and capital gains disappear in the hands of heirs
under current law.
In terms of the “backing up the income tax” rationale, note that the
99.7% of decedents who will not pay an estate tax will still be fully able to
pass along stepped-up basis to their heirs. If we take the stepped-up basis
rule as a central component of our wealth transfer tax system—as logic and
financial economics suggest we ought—then that tax system is only
“backing up” the income tax in the ironic sense that it is central to the tax

97. See supra Part I.
98. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
99. Estate and Gift Taxes, TAX POL’Y CENTER (2011), available at http://www.taxpolicy
center.org/taxtopics/estatetax.cfm.
100. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
101. Paul Sullivan, End of a Decade, supra note 4.
102. Id.
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system’s failure to tax wealth, or those who live off of wealth, as the next
section explores.
Finally, as far as breaking up large concentrations of wealth, the
discussion above on dynasty trusts and intentionally defective grantor trusts
(with some considerable overlap) suggests that the law as is may be creating
and exacerbating the problem of concentrated, dynastic on a very big scale.
The gift and estate tax, in other words, is essentially dead. Its sole
remaining purpose seems to be as an inducement for extremely wealthy
families to plan ahead to set up dynastic and other forms of trust to avoid
what is left of it. The tax is no longer the answer to any compelling
question.
IV. THE GORILLA IN THE ROOM
There is a deep irony that grows out of the analysis thus far. The Year
2010’s ultimately optional no estate tax or carryover basis regime, as
provided for by EGTRRA, is worse for most wealthy individuals and
families—and hence better for revenue-raising and the other compelling
goals for the law here—than the current law’s combination of a $5 million
and a 40% rate with a stepped-up basis.103 What TRA 2010 and ATRA 2012
did, in addition to raising the exemption level; indexing it “permanently;”
keeping rates low; and reunifying the gift, estate, and generation-skipping
taxes, was to maintain stepped-up basis as a seemingly “sacred cow” in the
statute. We have now seen, first under Jimmy Carter, and most recently
under EGTRRA, two attempts at a carryover basis regime for assets passed
at death—and both were, essentially, retroactively repealed.
The stepped-up basis rule of I.R.C. § 1014 provides the last step in what
I have dubbed “Tax Planning 101,” the advice to buy, borrow, and die.104 In
Step One, an individual buys an asset, such as real estate or growth stocks,
which rises in value without producing a taxable cash income stream,105
taking advantage of the realization requirement of Eisner v. Macomber.106 In
Step Two, the taxpayer borrows income tax free—by virtue of the basic
structure of an income tax—to finance her lifestyle. In Step Three, she dies,
passing the assets—and debt—along to her heirs. The assets are acquired by
the heirs tax-free, under I.R.C. § 102, and with a fully stepped-up basis,
under I.R.C. § 1014. They can now be sold tax-free and the debts paid off.

103. See generally McCaffery & Cohen, Shakedown, supra note 2.
104. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: INCOME TAX LAW 15
(2012); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 800, 888 (2005).
105. See MCCAFFERY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS, supra note 104, at 12–13 for the source
material that supports the assertions in the following sentences; see also McCaffery, New
Understanding, supra note 104, at 890–91.
106. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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Played right, Tax Planning 101 means no federal taxes—no payroll tax,
because the player does not “work” in a traditional sense; no income tax, for
the convergence of income tax rules just noted; and no gift or estate tax,
because the estate tax is a net tax on assets minus liabilities held at death,
and, properly played and planned, Tax Planning 101 does not leave a large
enough net estate on any deathbed to generate tax. The essential elements of
Tax Planning 101 have been in place for nearly 100 years, and have never
seriously been challenged. This leaves unrealized appreciation as the “800
pound gorilla” in the room, a major item of theoretical “income” left
altogether out of the tax base—and out of virtually all contemporary
discussions of “base broadening” and “loophole closing,” such as in the
repeated calls to limit personal deductions under the income tax (meaning
mainly the deductions for home mortgage interest, employer-provided health
care, charitable contributions and pension plans).107 Unlike these classic tax
expenditures, which largely affect wage-earners, the non-taxation of
unrealized appreciation affects—in a highly beneficial manner—those
wealthy individuals who live off financial capital, not traditional “work.”108
By buying capital assets that appreciate without producing taxable
dividends, borrowing to finance present consumption, and continuing the
game straight onto death, the rich can avoid all federal taxes.109 Warren
Buffet, Bill Gates, and countless others among the rich and famous have
figured this all out, perfectly well. Tax Planning 101 means no taxes,
notwithstanding a comfortable lifestyle for those with the assets in hand to
play it: those, that is, who live on the capital side of the capital-labor
divide.110 There are two pieces of critically important advice here. The first
is to buy assets rather than getting paid wages: that is, to get on the capital
side of the capital-labor divide. This is because wages are taxed. The
second is to save in a form that avoids current taxation. “Ordinary” savings,
such as those kept in a simple bank account, fall smack into the double-tax
sting of the income tax. By buying assets that rise in value without
triggering taxable gains—real estate works pretty well here—one gets to
107. Jesse Drucker, Buffett-Ducking Billionaires Avoid Reporting Cash Gains to IRS,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-21/billionairesduck-buffett-17-tax-target-avoiding-reporting-cash-to-irs.html.
108. See id.
109. The text of this paragraph appears in the book OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:
INCOME TAX LAW. MCCAFFERY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS, supra note 104, at 12–13, 15.
110. EDWARD MCCAFFERY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS, supra note 104, at 15. Further
information about Buy, Borrow, and Die can be found in the book Rich Dad, Poor Dad. ROBERT T.
KIYOSAKI & SHARON LECHTER, RICH DAD POOR DAD: WHAT THE RICH TEACH THEIR KIDS ABOUT
MONEY—THAT THE POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS DO NOT! (1997).
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grow wealthy without taxation. This is Robert Kioyasaki’s Rich Dad’s “rule
no. 1,” the “only rule.”111 It leads people to invest in, and the economy to
provide, non-cash-producing assets, such as real estate and Internet stocks:
two asset classes prone to spectacular bubbles. The somewhat obscure
debate over “carried interest” by hedge fund managers and private equity
investors is all about the attempt by these highly compensated individuals to
argue that their remuneration is “capital”—taxed at favorable capital gains
rates when it is taxed at all. That’s a distraction for another day.
Here then at last is a possible silver lining in the practical death of the
gift and estate tax: it removes the principal, and best, reason to maintain the
stepped-up basis rule. With far fewer than 1% of decedents even paying an
estate tax, the case for allowing the game of unrealized appreciation to move
from one of deferral to one of escape—as Section 1014 allows it to do—is
precarious at best. Canada has gone to a rule of capital gains on death—
making death a realization event.112 This deserves consideration in America
as well. Short of that, a systematic repeal of Section 1014 and a master rule
of carryover basis as provided for gifts under Section 1015 would widen the
tax base by bringing in previously untaxed capital appreciation. So it would
raise revenue. Joseph Dodge and Jay Soled have suggested that the problem
of overstating basis—taxpayers simply listing an incorrectly high basis in
their sold assets—costs the U.S. government $25 billion a year, and possibly
more.113 Without the burden of a meaningful estate tax to audit and
administer, the IRS can devote additional resources to monitoring the
problem of over- and misstated basis.114 A clear statutory presumption that
basis shall be zero unless the taxpayer can produce adequate records—a
serious substantiation requirement, such as we now have for travel and
entertainment expense deductions under the income tax—could also help.115
Either a realization-on-death or a consistent carryover basis rule, while
not being an ideal solution, would at least practically advance the four goals
of tax policy mentioned throughout this article.116 First, it would raise

111. KIYOSAKI & LECHTER, supra note 110, at 56.
112. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1993).
This sentence, and the ensuing paragraph, is also articulated in Edward J. McCaffery, A
Progressive’s Silver Lining Playbook: Repeal Stepped-Up Basis, TAX NOTES, February 25, 2013, at
969, 972. Printed with the permission of Tax Analysts.
113. Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Inflated Tax Basis and the Quarter-Trillion-Dollar
Revenue Question, 106 TAX NOTES 453, 459 (2005), available at http://www.taxanalysts.com/
www/freefiles.nsf/Files/106TN0453.pdf/$file/106TN0453.pdf.
114. See id. at 457–58 (discussing issues that the IRS faces with regard to tax basis
identifications).
115. See id. at 460.
116. This paragraph is derived from Edward J. McCaffery, A Progressive’s Silver Lining
Playbook: Repeal Stepped-Up Basis, TAX NOTES, February 25, 2013, at 969, 972. Printed with the
permission of Tax Analysts.
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revenue, by broadening the base. Second, it would “back up” the income tax
by assuring that appreciation is at least sometimes taxed. Third, it would
insert more progressivity into the system and at least help to break up large
concentrations of wealth by getting those who live off financial wealth to
sometime, somehow, pay some taxes.117 Fourth, either rule (especially the
capital-gains-at-death rule) would also undercut the “lock in” effect,
whereby many wealthy families hold onto assets until death in order to get
the stepped-up basis—a problem that almost certainly will be growing worse
under ATRA 2012, as few families face any real pressure to make lifetime
transfers to avoid the estate tax, the capital gains tax rate has increased
significantly—and stepped-up basis remains. The short story of ATRA
2012—as with many acts including TRA 1986—is that the wealthy, as
opposed to the high-income, won. Truly principled tax policy requires
rethinking that.
V. CONCLUSIONS, ADVICE, AND THE CURIOUS CASE FOR HOPE
Alas, here is my simple advice to the second Obama Administration in
regard to the gift and estate tax: forget about it. The tax, which was quite
possibly never a good idea, has ceased to play any real meaningful role in
meeting any compelling goal for tax policy, such as raising revenue,
breaking up concentrations of wealth, increasing the progressivity of the tax
system, or “backing up” the income tax.118 These goals can only plausibly
be met by attacking the planks in Tax Planning 101, individually or all at
once.119
I continue to believe, as I have written for years, that the best, most
systematic way to achieve these goals is to move the current “income” tax
(in fact a hybrid of income and consumption tax elements) into a consistent
progressive consumption, or equivalently, a cash-flow spending tax. Such a
comprehensive solution shuts down Tax Planning 101 primarily by
including debt-financed consumption in the tax base, renders the realization
requirement (and all issues of tax law “basis”) moot, and lays the foundation
for greater progressivity in the rate structure.120 But if it is politically

117. See id. at 461 n.69.
118. See supra Part IV.
119. See supra Part IV.
120. See generally EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM
BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002); Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines, Jr., The Last Best Hope for
Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (2010) (discussing the prospect of greater
progressivity in the tax rate structure).
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impracticable to go that far, and if there is no commitment to abrogating the
realization requirement or systematically rethinking the taxation of debt,
then the best available option is to attack the “die” step in buy, borrow, and
die, with either a capital gains or realization-on-death rule, in the manner of
Canada, or a straight repeal of I.R.C. § 1014, leaving a carryover basis
regime for all gratuitous transfers, in life or on death. Combined with a clear
presumption of zero basis unless rebutted by taxpayer records, and a serious
commitment to tracking and auditing all questions of basis, such a change
might indeed meet some of the goals motivating the failed near-century long
estate tax experiment.
Out of the ashes of the death tax’s demise, it just may be that hope
springs.
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